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Christians in early and classical Sunnī law
David M. Freidenreich
Islamic law devotes considerable attention to regulations related to
Christians, who comprised a significant minority population within
the medieval Islamic Near East. Such regulations appear in numerous
areas of law, and every compendium or treatise that addresses one or
more of these areas is likely to address Christians. Comprehensive
documentation of references to Christians in Islamic legal literature,
of the sort attempted in the preceding essay on Muslims in canon law,
is therefore practically impossible. Such an endeavor is also of questionable utility because different law books often cover the same
ground in very similar ways. The present essay seeks instead to sketch
Sunnī laws relating to Christians in broad strokes and to direct readers to relevant secondary scholarship for further details and for citations of the most important primary sources. Shīʿī laws regarding
Christians differ in significant ways from their Sunnī counterparts
and therefore merit separate treatment.1
The place of Christians and other non-Muslims in Islamic (primarily Sunnī) law has received considerable attention within academic
scholarship. Antoine Fattal’s Le statut légal des non-Musulmans en
pays d’Islam, a general survey, retains its value as an entry point into
the study of this subject. It has been supplemented and often surpassed by a variety of more focused studies, of which Yohanan Friedmann’s Tolerance and coercion in Islam deserves particular mention. A
number of works, including Fattal’s and especially Mark R. Cohen’s
Under crescent and cross, devote considerable attention to comparing
medieval Islamic laws governing non-Muslims with their counterparts in Roman, Sasanid, and Christian sources. Placed in this context
rather than viewed against the backdrop of twenty-first-century Western norms, the laws expressed in medieval Islamic sources appear
commonplace and even relatively benign; non-Muslims subject to
these laws, of course, surely did not see them as such.2
1
Essays surveying classical Shīʿī law and departures from classical approaches to
Christians among Sunnī and Shīʿī authorities appear in later volumes.
2
A. Fattal, Le statut légal des non-Musulmans en pays d’islam, Beirut, 1958;
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The literature on minorities in Islamic law, although strong in
many other respects, generally neglects to consider change over time
in regulations regarding non-Muslims. This tendency, which the present essay makes no attempt to rectify, is due in part to the significant
challenges associated with efforts to date legal works and normative
statements ascribed to what scholars call the ‘early’ or formative
period of Islamic law, roughly the first three Islamic centuries.
The onset of the ‘classical’ period of Sunnī law, which extends
beyond the year 1500, occurs in the tenth Christian century with the
crystallization of four schools of Sunnī legal thought named after and
oriented toward the teachings of eighth- or ninth-century ‘founders’.
The differences between these schools with respect to numerous
aspects of jurisprudential theory and legal substance result in sometimes significant differences in their respective laws regarding Christians, differences that medieval and modern scholars alike duly note
and discuss. In most cases, the authors of legal compendia and treatises were private citizens rather than government functionaries.
These works, therefore, express normative ideals that did not necessarily receive support from the coercive powers of the state. Indeed, as
an essay in a later volume discusses, Muslim political authorities at
times treated their Christian subjects in ways that contravened the
norms articulated in classical legal sources, sometimes to the benefit
of these subjects and sometimes to their detriment.

Y. Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion in Islam. Interfaith relations in the Muslim
tradition, Cambridge, 2003; M.R. Cohen, Under crescent and cross. The Jews in the
Middle Ages, Princeton NJ, 1994, esp. pp. 52-74. Much of Cohen’s discussion of Jews in
the Islamic world applies to Christians as well.
Scholars and others concerned about the contemporary rise of radical political Islamic
movements have written numerous works on the treatment of non-Muslims within
Islamic law. Representative of this genre, in its title and contributors, is R. Spencer (ed.),
The myth of Islamic tolerance. How Islamic law treats non-Muslims, Amherst NY, 2005;
Bat Ye’or, Mark Durie, Ibn Warraq, David G. Littman, Daniel Pipes, and Robert
Spencer each wrote multiple essays in this volume. Works by advocates of political
Islam paint a much more sympathetic picture of Islamic laws regarding non-Muslims;
see, for example, M.S. Chaudhry, Non-Muslim minorities in an Islamic state, Lahore,
1995. Neither camp offers a sufficiently nuanced portrait of this subject matter, and for
this reason the present essay steers clear of both. For a valuable analysis of the
historiography of minorities (principally Jews) in the Islamic world, see Cohen, Under
crescent and cross, pp. 3-14.
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The present essay highlights the manner in which Sunnī authorities
classify Christians.3 Most laws treat Christians as non-Muslims, no different from Jews, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and other ‘dhimmīs’, the term
for religious minorities to which we will return. Some treat Christians
as ‘Scripturists’ (‘People of the Book’), adherents of a religion based on
a divinely revealed scripture; as such, Christians are classified alongside Jews and Muslims.4 This distribution pattern encapsulates the
place of Christians within the worldview of Sunnī jurists: Christians
are inferior to Muslims yet they, along with Jews, merit a limited
degree of parity with Muslims. Hardly any laws treat Christians in a
class alone, and those that do make clear that the authors of early and
classical Sunnī legal literature generally perceive Christianity as posing nothing more than a theoretical challenge for Muslims. In the
wake of European Christian military conquests, especially in the Iberian peninsula, some Muslim authorities developed a more defensive
posture regarding Christians than is manifest in classical texts; an
essay in a later volume addresses this development.
Christians as dhimmīs
A sizeable majority of Islamic law regarding Christians treats the latter as dhimmīs – more formally, ahl al-dhimma, ‘people subject to a
guarantee of protection’. This term applies solely to non-Muslims living in lands governed by Muslims who accept the authority of their
Muslim overlords; it thus excludes both rebellious non-Muslims and
non-Muslims who live outside the Islamic world, including those who
reside temporarily in Muslim lands for trade or other purposes.5 Some
3
On the classification of non-Muslims, see also Y. Friedmann, ‘Classification of
unbelievers in Sunnī Muslim law and tradition’, JSAI 22 (1998) 163-95, revised and
expanded in his Tolerance and coercion, pp. 54-86.
4
The familiar term ‘People of the Book’ is a literal trans. of the Arabic phrase ahl
al-kitāb. Most legal sources employ the term kitābī, which refers to an individual
member of one of these peoples. For ease of reference, I translate kitābī as ‘Scripturist’.
To my knowledge, this term was coined by N. Robinson; Friedmann, in contrast,
employs the tongue-twisting term ‘Scriptuary’, perhaps inspired by the French
‘Scripturaire’ used by Fattal.
5
No legal protection is granted to rebellious non-Muslims, such as those who
support foreign invaders, or to non-Muslims resident in the territory of foreign
enemies. A handful of laws address non-Muslim visitors to Muslim lands and nonMuslims who reside in foreign domains with which Muslims have negotiated an
armistice. Other laws address the status of Muslims who dwell outside the Islamic world
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jurists limit the protection associated with dhimmī status to Jews and
Christians; others extend that protection to most or virtually all other
non-Muslims as well.6 Conversion to Islam frees the convert from the
obligations incumbent upon dhimmīs, and jurists often seek to insure
that the act of conversion redounds to the convert’s advantage.
Islamic law obligates Muslim authorities to abstain from acts of
hostility toward dhimmīs, to accord them various rights, and to protect them from attack by Muslims or foreigners. It further grants to
dhimmīs, including the slaves and wives of Muslim masters, the right
to freely exercise their religion in private.7 Dhimmīs, in turn, must
acknowledge their subservience to Muslim authorities and adhere to
Islamic laws governing dhimmīs. Non-Muslims who refuse to accept
these terms or who renege on their commitments forfeit the right to
live as non-Muslims in the lands of Islam. Enforcement of dhimmī
obligations was generally entrusted to the muḥtasib, the government
official responsible for ensuring public morality.8
Chief among the obligations incumbent upon dhimmīs is payment
of the jizya, a qurʾānic obligation which Muslim jurists classically
understand to refer to an annual poll tax imposed solely upon nonMuslims.9 Jurists offer two distinct interpretations of the jizya, each of
or enter foreign lands temporarily for the purpose of trade; on this subject, discussed in
greater detail in an essay in a later volume, see K. Abou el Fadl, ‘Islamic law and Muslim
minorities. The juristic discourse on Muslim minorities from the second/eighth to the
eleventh/seventeenth centuries’, Islamic Law and Society 1 (1994) 141-87.
6
On the legal conception of ‘dhimmitude’, to use the term coined by Bat Ye’or,
see Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 71-84. On the category of ahl al-dhimma and its scope,
see Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, pp. 54-55, 58-69, 72-83; Fattal, Statut légal,
pp. 160-63; see also Y. Friedmann, ‘The temple of Multān. A note on early Muslim
attitudes to idolatry’, Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972) 176-82.
7
Some of the ramifications of this right are explored by Friedmann, Tolerance and
coercion, pp. 187-90; R. Marston Speight, ‘The place of Christians in ninth-century
North Africa, according to Muslim sources’, Islamochristiana 4 (1978) 47-65, pp. 53,
59. The latter essay surveys references to non-Muslims in the Mudawwana, the
foundational compendium of Mālikī law ascribed to Saḥnūn (d. 854).
8
See A. García-Sanjuán, ‘Jews and Christians in Almoravid Seville as portrayed by
the Islamic jurist Ibn ʿAbdūn’, Medieval Encounters 14 (2008) 78-98; G. Weigert, ‘A
note on the muḥtasib and ahl al-dhimma’, Der Islam 75 (1998) 331-37. García-Sanjuán
translates and analyses the relevant extracts from Ibn ʿAbdūn’s manual for the muḥtasib;
relevant extracts from other Andalusian works of this genre appear in C. Melville and
A. Ubaydli, Christians and Moors in Spain. Vol. 3, Arabic sources (711-1501), Warminster,
1992, pp. 112-15.
9
Q 9:29. The original meaning of this verse has been subject to considerable
scholarly debate, whose major players include M.M. Bravmann, C. Cahen, M.J. Kister,
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which accounts for different details in the laws governing its payment.
On the one hand, this tax constitutes a fee for services rendered to
dhimmīs by Muslims: the right to live as non-Muslims in Islamic territories, exemption from military service, and the protection provided
by Muslim soldiers. For this reason, jurists generally exempt women,
minors, slaves, and the infirm from the jizya payment, as Muslims in
these categories are exempt from military service. (Authorities differ
over whether and to what degree the tax applies to indigent dhimmīs.)10
On the other hand, the jizya constitutes a penalty imposed upon nonMuslims on account of their refusal to embrace Islam. This notion
underlies the widespread norm of exacting payment of the jizya in
humiliating circumstances.11 Dhimmīs are also required to pay distinctive property taxes and to pay taxes on commercial transactions at a
higher rate than Muslims.12
The inferiority of dhimmīs to their Muslim overlords exemplified
in the humiliation associated with payment of the jizya is reinforced
and U. Rubin. Ibn Warraq (ed.), What the Koran really says: Language, text, and
commentary, Amherst NY, 2002, pp. 343-86, helpfully anthologizes (and, where
necessary, translates from the French original) the relevant essays and notes on this
subject, which first appeared in Arabica 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14, and Der Islam 70.
10
In addition to the primary references cited in the following note, see E. Alschech,
‘Islamic law, practice, and legal doctrine. Exempting the poor from the jizya under
the Ayyubids (1171-1250)’, Islamic Law and Society 10 (2003) 348-75.
11
On the jizya: Cohen, Under crescent and cross, pp. 56, 68-72; Fattal, Statut légal,
pp. 264-91. See also Speight, ‘Place of Christians’, pp. 54-55, and the references in the
following note. On the humiliating nature of this tax as administered in seventh- and
eighth-century Syria and Iraq, see also C.F. Robinson, ‘Neck-sealing in early Islam’,
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 48 (2005) 401-41. The Banū
Taghlib, an Arab Christian tribe, reportedly objected to payment of the jizya precisely
because of the humiliation involved in its payment, humiliation which the tribesmen
felt ought not to be imposed upon Arabs; see n. 43.
12
Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 292-313. On tax administration in general and taxes
imposed upon non-Muslims in particular, see M.G. Morony, Iraq after the Muslim
conquest, Princeton NJ, 1984, pp. 99-124. The Kitāb al-kharāj of Yaʿqūb Abū Yūsuf
(d. 798), an early treatise on Islamic tax law by one of the ‘founders’ of the Ḥ anafī school
of jurisprudence, contains several chapters regarding the taxation and treatment of
dhimmīs and exists in a variety of modern editions and translations; see the entry
‘Abū Yūsuf ’ in this volume. Relevant extracts from the Kitāb al-kharāj appear in
N. Stillman, The Jews of Arab lands. A history and source book, Philadelphia PA, 1979,
pp. 159-61; for another source that recounts the manner in which jizya was paid
during the thirteenth century, see p. 180. A different extract from the Kitāb al-kharāj
and other relevant sources on the status of non-Muslims appear in B. Lewis (ed.),
Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the capture of Constantinople, 2 vols, New York,
1974, ii (Religion and society), pp. 217-35.
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through a variety of laws. Many of these appear in the so-called ‘Pact
of ʿUmar’, which purports to be a set of surrender terms proposed by
Christians to the second Caliph, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭtạ̄ b (r. 634-44);
jurists ultimately applied the terms in this pact to all dhimmīs, overriding local capitulation agreements. Scholars dismiss the association
of this pact with ʿUmar but find in its contents and form elements that
reflect eighth- and ninth-century historical realities, including extant
capitulation treaties and common caliphal administrative practices.13
Among the terms of the Pact of ʿUmar, Christians obligate themselves
to show deference to Muslims by rising when Muslims wish to sit and
refraining from building homes higher than those of Muslims. Christians must provide hospitality to traveling Muslims, may not shelter
foreign spies, and may not strike Muslims, nor may they purchase
slaves whose service ought to benefit Muslims.14 Christians further
agree not to ride horses or to bear arms, both symbols of elevated
social status, and commit themselves to wear their traditional clothing and not to adopt Muslim styles of dress, honorific titles, or Arabic
signets; these practices, which may have originally been meant to preserve the distinction between Muslims and the majority population,
ultimately became signs of humiliation as well.15
13
See the entry ‘Pact of ʿUmar’ in this volume, and the references cited there. Milka
Levy-Rubin, author of this entry, elsewhere challenges scholarly consensus by arguing
that the restrictions found in the Pact of ʿUmar were in fact regularly and effectively
enforced by medieval Muslim rulers; see M. Levy-Rubin, ‘From early harbingers of
shurūṭ ʿUmar to its systematic enforcement’, in Border crossings. Interreligious interaction and the exchange of ideas in the Islamic Middle Ages, ed. D.M. Freidenreich and
M. Goldstein, Philadelphia (forthcoming), and also her forthcoming book on this
subject. On the supersession of local treaties, see also H.E. Kassis, ‘Some aspects of
the legal position of Christians under Mālikī jurisprudence in al-Andalus’, Pd’O 24
(1999) pp. 114-16.
14
On the last of these restrictions, see Cohen, Under crescent and cross, pp. 64-65.
15
On regulations governing the clothing worn by Christians, see Cohen, Under
crescent and cross, pp. 62-64; Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 96-112; I. Lichtenstadter, ‘The distinctive dress of non-Muslims in Islamic countries’, Historia Judaica 5 (1943) 35-52;
A.S. Tritton, The caliphs and their non-Muslim subjects. A critical study of the Covenant of ʿUmar, London, 1930, 19702, pp. 115-26. On both clothing restrictions and the
right to ride animals, see also E. Ashtor, ‘The social isolation of ahl adh-dhimma’, in
Pal Hirschler memorial book, Budapest, 1949, 74-85 (repr. in The medieval Near East.
Social and economic history, London, 1978). Restrictions governing the clothing and
riding practices of non-Muslims appear consistently in medieval accounts of an edict
promulgated by the Caliph ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, with whom some scholars associate the Pact of ʿUmar itself; see Levy-Rubin, ‘From early harbingers’, and Levy-Rubin’s
forthcoming book. On the question of why Christians would commit themselves to
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Various legal sources also prohibit Muslims themselves from adopting
the mannerisms of non-Muslims, especially in matters of dress and
ritual, and instruct Muslims to refrain from greeting non-Muslims in
the same manner that they greet fellow believers.16 Jurists from
Andalusia express particular concern about the differentiation of
Muslims and Christians.17 This elevated concern is often manifest in
differences of opinion between members of the Mālikī school of jurisprudence, dominant in Andalusia and North Africa, and jurists affiliated with other Sunnī schools.
Laws regarding dhimmīs exemplify the dictum, ‘Islam is superior
and cannot be superceded’.18 For this reason, Islamic law prohibits
dhimmīs from serving in positions of authority over Muslims, whether
as public officials, members of the military, or owners of Muslim slaves;
the law also restricts commercial interactions in which a Muslim
might become inferior to a dhimmī.19 According to one authority,
seemingly humiliating restrictions, see M.R. Cohen, ‘What was the Pact of ʿUmar? A
literary-historical study’, JSAI 23 (1999) 100-57, pp. 129-30, and, with particular attention
to matters of dress, A. Noth, ‘Abgrenzungsprobleme zwischen Muslimen und NichtMuslimen. Die “Bedingungen ʿUmars (aŝ-Ŝurūṭ al-ʿUmariyya)” unter einem anderen
Aspekt gelesen’, JSAI 9 (1987) 290-315 (trans. M. Muelhaeusler, ‘Problems of differentiation between Muslims and non-Muslims. Re-reading the “Ordinances of ʿUmar
(al-shurūṭ al-ʿUmariyya)” ’, in R. Hoyland (ed.), Muslims and others in early Islamic society, Aldershot, 2004, 103-24.
16
See M.J. Kister, ‘ “Do not assimilate yourselves . . .”: lā tashabbahū’, JSAI 12 (1989)
321-71 (repr. in Hoyland, Muslims and others). Kister emphasizes that these
prohibitions originated in the early period of Islamic law. It is noteworthy that most
of the prohibitions Kister adduces address practices associated with Judaism or preIslamic Arabian religion and only a small number relate specifically to Christian
practices. On the proper greetings to offer non-Muslims and proper interaction
with one’s non-Muslim neighbor, see also Cohen, Under crescent and cross, pp. 131-32;
H.E. Kassis, ‘Arabic-speaking Christians in al-Andalus in an age of turmoil (fifth/
eleventh century until AH 478/AD 1085)’, Al-Qanṭara 15 (1994) 401-50, pp. 405-7.
17
See J.M. Safran, ‘Identity and differentiation in ninth-century al-Andalus’,
Speculum 76 (2001) 573-98; see also García-Sanjuán, ‘Jews and Christians’; Kassis, ‘Legal
position of Christians’.
18
Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Vaduz, Liechtenstein: Jamʿiyyat al-Makniz al-Islāmī, 2000), 23.79.
This ḥ adīth is adduced by Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, p. 35, and A. Fattal,
‘How dhimmīs were judged in the Islamic world’, in Hoyland, Muslims and others,
p. 89, both of whom cite the tradition as appearing in 23.80. (The latter essay is a
trans. by S. Pickford, of ‘Comment les dhimmis étaient jugés en terre d’islam’, Cahiers
d’Histoire Egyptienne 3 (1951) 321-41.)
19
The prohibition against dhimmīs in public office, rooted in numerous qurʾānic
verses and ḥ adīths, was often ignored by rulers in the interest of expediency. Jurists
differ over the legitimacy of employing dhimmīs in the military. See Friedmann,
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Muslims ought not to perform menial labor on behalf of dhimmīs or
allow themselves to be treated by non-Muslim physicians.20
The principle that Muslims should not be subject to the authority of
non-Muslims underlies a number of inequities in the administration
of justice in Islamic law. Legal proceedings involving a Muslim and a
dhimmī must be held in an Islamic court, although dhimmīs are entitled to turn to their own judicial authorities for internal matters.21
When the accused is a Muslim, dhimmīs are not allowed to offer testimony against him; some jurists reject the legitimacy of testimony by
dhimmīs in all circumstances on the grounds that non-Muslims are
presumed to be untrustworthy as witnesses.22 Some jurists value the
worth of Muslims and non-Muslims differently for the purpose of
assessing penalties in cases of murder or bodily injury; others assert
that payment of the jizya entitles dhimmīs to equal treatment under the
law in this respect.23 Islamic law denies dhimmīs the right to inherit
from relatives who converted to Islam; authorities differ over whether
Muslims are entitled to inherit from non-Muslim relatives and whether
dhimmīs of different confessions may inherit one from another.24
Islamic law seeks to create a society that makes manifest the supremacy of Islam, and to this end it curtails the public display of nonMuslim religious life even as it allows non-Muslims to practice their
own religions. Several of the terms of the Pact of ʿUmar relate
specifically to religious matters. Chief among these is the rule that
Christians may not build new churches, monasteries, or other religious
buildings, and that they may not restore any such buildings that fall into

Tolerance and coercion, pp. 36-37; Cohen, Under crescent and cross, pp. 65-68; Fattal,
Statut légal, pp. 232-63; see also Tritton, Caliphs and their non-Muslim subjects, pp. 18-36.
On commercial interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims, see Fattal, Statut légal,
pp. 144-50; Speight, ‘Place of Christians’, pp. 59-60.
20
García-Sanjuán, ‘Jews and Christians’, pp. 84-86.
21
Islamic law also governs cases involving dhimmīs of different confessions and cases
in which the parties choose to turn to a Muslim judge. See Fattal, ‘How dhimmīs were
judged’; see also Speight, ‘Place of Christians’, pp. 61-62.
22
Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, pp. 35-36; Fattal, ‘How dhimmīs were judged’,
pp. 98-102; Speight, ‘Place of Christians’, pp. 60-61.
23
Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, pp. 39-53; Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 113-18; see
also Speight, ‘Place of Christians’, pp. 60-61. One example of differential penalties is
referred to below in n. 36.
24
Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, pp. 55-58; Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 137-42; see
also Speight, ‘Place of Christians’, pp. 55-56. On the rights of dhimmīs to establish
endowments, see Fattal, Statut légal, p. 143.
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ruin or are located in Muslim neighborhoods. This rule, however, was
not regularly enforced, and jurists developed a variety of exceptions
and qualifications to it.25 Christians agree not to proselytize and not
to prevent Christians from converting to Islam. The Pact of ʿUmar
also obligates Christians to refrain from holding public religious
ceremonies and displaying religious symbols publicly, to beat the
wooden clappers of their churches (the local equivalent of church bells)
very quietly, not to raise their voices when praying, and to direct their
funeral processions away from Muslim populations.26 These regulations
collectively serve to minimize the visible ‘footprint’ of Christianity
within the Islamic world. Sunnī authorities, however, generally do not
impose distinctively Islamic norms on dhimmīs. Thus, for example,
Christians may not sell wine among Muslims but they may purchase,
possess, and consume it themselves, even when married to Muslim
husbands;27 similarly, dhimmīs may engage in interest-generating
commercial activities among themselves. Violating Islamic norms of
blasphemy, however, nullifies the terms of the dhimma and merits
capital punishment.28
Because of Islam’s supremacy over all religions, including those
previously revealed by God, conversion from Islam to Christianity or
any other religion is strictly forbidden, as is Muslim participation in
Christian festivals.29 Whereas born Christians are eligible for dhimmī
25
Kassis, ‘Legal position of Christians’, pp. 118-25; Cohen, Under crescent and cross,
pp. 58-60; Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 174-203; see also Tritton, Caliphs and their nonMuslim subjects, pp. 37-77. On legal attitudes towards the presence of non-Muslim
residents and their religious institutions in Muslim neighborhoods, see M. LevyRubin, ‘Shurūṭ ʿUmar and its alternatives. The legal debate on the status of the
dhimmīs’, JSAI 30 (2005) 170-206; Ashtor, ‘Social isolation’, pp. 85-88.
26
Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 203-11; see also Tritton, Caliphs and their non-Muslim
subjects, pp. 100-14.
27
On this and other regulations guaranteeing non-Muslim wives freedom of
religion, see Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, pp. 188-90; S.A. Spectorsky, ‘Women
of the People of the Book. Intermarriage in early fiqh texts’, in B.H. Hary, J.L. Hayes
and F. Astren (eds), Judaism and Islam: Boundaries, communication and interaction.
Essays in honor of William M. Brinner, Leiden, 2000, 269-78, p. 274. Some authorities,
however, prohibit all dhimmīs from possessing or consuming wine; see Levy-Rubin,
‘From early harbingers’.
28
See Safran, ‘Identity and differentiation’, pp. 588-97; A. Turki, ‘Situation du
“tributaire” qui insulte l’islam, au regard de la doctrine et de la jurisprudence
musulmanes’, Studia Islamica 30 (1969) 39-72; Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 122-24.
29
Concern about participation in Christian festivals is especially prevalent in
Andalusian and North African sources. See Safran, ‘Identity and differentiation’, p. 581;
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status, converts to Christianity from Islam are ineligible for this status
and are therefore liable to the death penalty if they refuse to re-embrace
Islam. Some authorities similarly forbid conversion from one nonMuslim religion to another on the grounds that one may not choose
any religion over Islam. Forced conversion of non-Muslims is generally forbidden, and some jurists therefore allow non-Muslims who
converted out of duress to return to their original religion. Jurists do,
however, condone the compulsory conversion of non-Muslim women,
minors, and prisoners of war in various circumstances.30 Islamic law
defines the offspring of marriages between Muslim men and Christian
women as Muslims. Some jurists infer from this that the offspring of
mixed marriages among dhimmīs are to be affiliated to the religion of
their father, but most affiliate such children to the superior of the parents’ faiths; in the latter case, the child of a Zoroastrian father and
Christian mother is a Christian.31
Non-Muslims may not reside in the region of Mecca and Medina,
in accordance with the last will of the Prophet; jurists differ over
whether this prohibition extends to the entirety of the Arabian peninsula, and whether it applies to visitors. Many jurists specifically prohibit non-Muslims from entering the precincts of the Kaʿba in Mecca,
and some extend this prohibition to all mosques.32 Proceeds from
zakāt, the alms tax obligatory upon Muslims, may not be given to
non-Muslims who would otherwise qualify for such aid, although
Muslims are welcome to give other forms of charity to non-Muslims.33
Various authorities prohibit non-Muslims from possessing or studying the Qurʾān or other sacred Islamic texts, a prohibition sometimes
associated with the assertion that non-Muslims are impure.34
R.M. Speight, ‘Muslim attitudes toward Christians in the Maghrib during the Faṭimid
period, 297/909-358/969’, in Y.Y. Haddad and W.Z. Haddad (eds), Christian-Muslim
encounters, Gainesville FL, 1995, 180-92, pp. 185-86; H.E. Kassis, ‘Muslim revival in
Spain in the fifth/eleventh century: Causes and ramifications’, Der Islam 67 (1990)
78-110, pp. 85-86.
30
Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, pp. 106-59; Safran, ‘Identity and
differentiation’, pp. 585-88; Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 163-69.
31
Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, pp. 174-75; Speight, ‘Place of Christians’,
pp. 58-59. On the status of children when one parent converts to Islam, see M. Shatzmiller,
‘Marriage, family, and the faith: Women’s conversion to Islam’, Journal of Family
History 21 (1996) 235-66, pp. 247-48.
32
Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 85-93.
33
Speight, ‘Place of Christians’, p. 57.
34
Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 144, 148-49, 159. Some jurists also express concern about
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Islamic legal literature tends to regard non-Muslims as impure, but
jurists vigorously debate the reason for this status and its implications
for Muslim-dhimmī interactions. Sunnīs generally hold that nonMuslims are impure by virtue of their failure to perform the purification rituals necessary to restore the state of purity that is disrupted by
any number of normal events. These jurists also speak of the beliefs of
non-Muslims as ‘impure’ in a metaphorical sense. Some Sunnīs, however, hold that non-Muslims are intrinsically, and not merely circumstantially, impure on account of their beliefs. This minority opinion is
especially prominent among jurists from Andalusia and North Africa,
who tend to refer specifically to the impurity of Christians; scholars
have suggested that social factors distinctive to the region may underlie this position. Even these jurists, however, do not regard the impurity of non-Muslims as grounds for stringent measures separating
Muslims from non-Muslims of the sort that ultimately developed in
some Shīʿī circles; Muslims who come into contact with non-Muslims
in a state of impurity are simply enjoined to perform the necessary act
of ablution before engaging in ritual activity.35 Consequently, the
notion that non-Muslims are impure does not interfere with Sunnī
laws that permit certain forms of intimacy between Muslims and People of the Book, permissions associated with the fact that Christians
and Jews adhere to divinely revealed Scriptures.
Christians as Scripturists
Islamic laws that treat Christians as dhimmīs tend to impose rules and
restrictions on the activity of non-Muslims. Laws that treat Christians
as Scripturists, in contrast, are primarily reflexive in nature: they regulate what Muslims themselves may or may not do in matters that
Christians teaching either the Qurʾān or prior revelations to Muslims; see Speight,
‘Muslim attitudes’, p. 185. On the impurity of non-Muslims, see the references in the
following note.
35
Z. Maghen, ‘Strangers and brothers. The ritual status of unbelievers in Islamic
jurisprudence’, Medieval Encounters 12 (2006) 173-223; J.M. Safran, ‘Rules of purity
and confessional boundaries. Mālikī debates about the pollution of the Christian’,
History of Religions 42 (2003) 197-212; M.H. Katz, Body of text. The emergence of the
Sunnī law of ritual purity, Albany NY, 2002, pp. 157-67; see also Safran, ‘Identity and
differentiation’, pp. 581-83. On Shīʿī conceptions of non-Muslim impurity and its
implications, see Maghen’s essay and the essay on Christians in early and classical
Shīʿī law in a later volume.

110

Christians in early and classical Sunnī law

relate to non-Muslims. Laws that fall into this latter category may still
profitably be labeled ‘dhimmī law’ – analogous to Christian ‘Jewry law’
and ‘Saracen law’ – as they presume the inferiority and subservience
of the Christians (and Jews).36 These laws, however, emphasize the relatively elevated status of Christians and Jews among non-Muslims.
Whereas the laws surveyed in the previous section express a binary
distinction between Us and Them (1 and 0), laws that treat Christians
as Scripturists reveal that Muslim jurists embraced a more complex
system for classifying foreigners, one in which Christians and Jews
are, in mathematical terms, less than 1 but greater than 0.
This intermediate status is given numerical expression by some
jurists in their discussion of the blood-money that is due in certain
cases to the surviving relatives of a murder victim. According to
jurists of the Mālikī and Ḥ anbalī schools, the amount of the bloodmoney when the victim is a Christian or Jew is either 4,000 or 6,000
dirhams, whereas when the victim is a Zoroastrian or another type of
non-Muslim the payment due is only 800 dirhams. (The blood-money
for a Muslim victim is 12,000 dirhams.) Other jurists hold that the
value of the blood-money is identical, regardless of the affiliation of
the victim; one jurist, Ibn Ḥ azm, holds on technical grounds that no
blood-money is paid when the victim is a non-Muslim.37
Most legal discussion of Christians as Scripturists stems from the
qurʾānic verse:
Permitted to you this day are the good things, and the food of those
who were given the Book is permitted to you, and your food is permitted to them. So are the chaste women among the believers and the
chaste women among those who were given the Book before you, provided you give them their dowries and take them in chastity, not in
wantonness or as mistresses. If anyone denies the faith, his work shall
be of no avail to him, and in the Hereafter he will be among the losers.
(Q 5:5)

Sunnī interpreters and jurists uniformly understand the term ‘food’
(ṭaʿām) in this verse as referring to all foodstuffs that God has not prohibited, including permissible meat, the subject of the preceding
36

On the terms ‘imposed law’, ‘reflexive law’, ‘Jewry law’, and ‘Saracen law’, see the
companion essay on canon law in this volume, which observes that Christian Saracen
law from ca. 650 to 1000, unlike Jewry law from the period, was exclusively reflexive
in its nature.
37
Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, pp. 47-50.
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verses. Animal slaughter was regarded as a divinely prescribed ritual
activity in Near Eastern antiquity. For this reason, the declaration that
the slaughter practices of ‘the believers’ and the slaughter practices of
‘those who were given the Book’ are equally valid indicates that Christians and Jews, no less than Muslims themselves, act in accordance
with authentic divine revelations.38 The meat of animals slaughtered
by Zoroastrians, in contrast, is forbidden for consumption by Muslims. The permission of meat prepared by Scripturists expresses the
affinity – indeed, the parity – of Jews, Christians, and Muslims.39
The limits to this parity, however, become apparent as Q 5:5 continues.
‘Chaste women among those who were given the Book before you’ are
no less suitable for marriage than ‘chaste women among the believers’
because all come from communities committed to an authentic Scripture; idolatrous women, in contrast, are unfit marriage partners (Q 2:221).
Nevertheless, a Muslim woman may not marry a Christian or Jewish
man because a Muslim wife may not be subservient to a non-Muslim
husband.40 Sunnī jurists, who regard such a union as a serious breach
of the proper social order, prescribe severe punishments for dhimmīs
who transgress this norm, and they require married women who convert to Islam to separate from their non-Muslim husbands if the husbands do not follow suit.41 Q 5:5 and the legal discussions that develop
38
Some authorities, however, require that Christian butchers slaughter animals
under Muslim supervision to ensure that the butchers do in fact follow divine dictates
in this manner. In addition to the references cited in the following note, see Fattal,
Statut légal, p. 97.
39
See D.M. Freidenreich, Thou shalt not eat with them: Foreigners and their food in
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic law, Berkeley CA, forthcoming, a revision of Foreign food.
A comparatively-enriched analysis of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic law, New York, 2006
(Diss. Columbia University). See also N. Tsafrir, ‘The attitude of Sunnī Islam toward
Jews and Christians as reflected in some legal issues’, Al-Qanṭara 26 (2005) 317-28;
M.K. Masud, ‘Food and the notion of purity in the fatāwā literature’, in M. Marín and
D. Waines (eds), Alimentacion de las culturas Islamicas, Madrid, 1994, 89-110; Speight,
‘Place of Christians’, pp. 57-58. Masud focuses primarily on modern interpretations of
early and classical opinions regarding Christian meat.
40
Nor, according to many jurists, may a Muslim free man marry a non-Muslim
slave woman: the incongruity in status between the superior man and the doubly
inferior woman is too great. (Muslim men may marry Muslim slave women.) See the
primary references cited in the following note.
41
On laws governing interfaith marriage, see Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion,
pp. 160-93; Spectorsky, ‘Women of the People of the Book’; Shatzmiller, ‘Marriage,
family, and the faith’; see also Tsafrir, ‘Attitude of Sunnī Islam’, pp. 228-32; Speight,
‘Place of Christians’, pp. 58-59. On Mālikī disapproval of such marriages, even while
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around it strike a careful balance between the legitimation of Christianity and Judaism on the one hand and the affirmation of Islam’s
superiority on the other. The former principle, no less than the latter,
is crucial to the self-definition of Islam that emerges from these texts:
Islam stands in continuity with its predecessor religions even as it
constitutes the culmination and climax of God’s unfolding revelation.
The theological and definitional issues at stake in the permission of
Christian meat and Christian wives become clear in legal discussions
of borderline Christian communities. Some jurists limit the application of these permissions to dhimmīs: only Christians who acknowledge the superiority of Islam may be granted a limited degree of parity
with Muslims.42 The Banū Taghlib, a large and powerful Arab Christian tribe at the time of the Arab conquest, attracts particular attention in the legal literature and becomes paradigmatic of Arab
Christians in general.43 Most Sunnī authorities treat the Banū Taghlib
as Christians even if they might be ignorant of their religion’s tenets
or latecomers to the faith. Some, however, express antipathy toward
the Taghlibīs and refuse to extend to them the permissive laws that
apply to other Christians, apparently out of a sense that all Arabs
ought to embrace the teachings of God’s Messenger to the Arabs. Others limit these permissive laws to Christians whose ancestors converted to Christianity before the time of Muḥammad. Pre-Islamic
converts, after all, associated themselves with the best form of religion
then in existence, but those who converted to Christianity after the
time of Muḥammad rejected their obligation to believe not only in

acknowledging their permissibility, see also Safran, ‘Identity and differentiation’, pp.
583-84.
42
Freidenreich, Foreign food, p. 295. This position, advanced solely by jurists
affiliated with the Mālikī school, constitutes another instance of a restrictive attitude
toward Christians distinctive to Andalusian and North African legal sources.
Similarly, Mālikīs express greater opposition to Muslim patronage of non-Muslim
butchers and are the only Sunnī jurists who question the permissibility of wild
animals killed by Christian hunters.
43
On the Banū Taghlib, see M. Lecker, ‘Tribes in pre- and early Islamic Arabia’, in
Lecker, People, tribes and society in Arabia around the time of Muḥ ammad, Aldershot,
2005, XI, pp. 34-47. On the legal status of this and other groups of Arab Christians,
see Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion, pp. 60-69; on payment of the jizya by
Taghlibīs, see also Fattal, Statut légal, pp. 274-75. N. Tsafrir, Yaḥ as ha-halakhah
ha-muslemit kelapei datot aḥ erot: `Inyanei sheḥ iṭah ve-nisu’in, Jerusalem, 1988 (MA
diss. The Hebrew University), pp. 16-29, helpfully traces the history of normative
traditions regarding Arab Christians in general and the Banū Taghlib in particular.
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God but also in his final Prophet. The Shāfiʿī jurist Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf
al-Nawawī (d. 1277) draws a further distinction between those whose
ancestors embraced Christianity before that religion was corrupted
and those whose ancestors converted between the time of its corruption and the revelation of the Qurʾān. As Muslim jurists themselves
did not know when Christianity became corrupted, this distinction is
of no practical value and reflects the scholastic nature of much of the
discussion regarding laws that treat Christians as Scripturists. These
laws serve first and foremost to express Sunnī ideas regarding the relationship between Islam and its predecessor religions.44
The focus of Islamic legal discourse regarding Christians on issues
of theoretical rather than practical relevance is also apparent in the
only legal discussion known to this author that treats Christians not
as dhimmīs or Scripturists but rather as believers in the divinity of
Christ.45 Islamic law requires Muslim butchers to invoke the name of
God over the act of animal slaughter, and Muslim jurists presume that
idolatrous butchers invoke the name of a being other than God. These
jurists also discuss the status of meat prepared by a Christian butcher
who invokes the name of Christ. As no Christian source indicates that
Christian butchers actually engaged in this practice, it would seem
that these discussions are scholastic in their orientation, designed to
probe the degree to which Islam’s legitimation of Christianity excuses
Christians from the basic principles of Islamic monotheism.46
The debate regarding meat from animals slaughtered in the name
of Christ is surprisingly vigorous, with prominent Sunnī authorities
lining up on both sides of the argument. Most jurists express serious
reservations about the permissibility of such meat, but even those
who prohibit its consumption are careful to preserve the permissibility in principle of meat prepared by Christians. The symbolic significance of this permission, embodying as it does the affinity between
Islam and its predecessor traditions, is evidently of considerable
44
Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, 5 vols, Beirut, 2000, v, pp. 474-75.
See Freidenreich, Thou shalt not eat with them.
45
On this subject, see Freidenreich, Thou shalt not eat with them; see also
D.M. Freidenreich, ‘Five questions about non-Muslim meat. Toward a new appreciation of
Ibn Qayyim al-Ğawziyyah’s contribution to Islamic law’, Oriente Moderno (forthcoming);
Tsafrir, ‘Attitude of Sunnī Islam’, pp. 323-28.
46
Of more practical relevance are parallel discussions regarding meat prepared for
Christian feast days; opinions regarding such meat tend to match those regarding the
meat of animals slaughtered in the name of Christ.
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importance to Sunnī jurists. Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn al-ʿArabī
(d. 1148), who goes so far as to permit Muslim consumption of chickens which Christians slaughter in a manner that contravenes Islamic
law, captures the logic that motivates Sunnī jurists to bend over backwards in their efforts to permit Christian meat: ‘Greater respect is
accorded to [Christians] than to idolaters because they adhere to
God’s Book and cling to the coat tails of prophets.’47 Even as they seek
to ensure the absolute superiority of Islam and its adherents over all
others, Sunnī jurists are careful to express in limited ways the relatively elevated status of Christians and Jews as People of the Book.

Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥ kām al-Qurʾān, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad
al-Bajāwī, Cairo, 1957, on Q 5:5. For another example of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s permissive
attitude toward restrictions associated with Christians, see J.D. McAuliffe, ‘Legal
exegesis: Christians as a case study’, in L. Ridgeon (ed.), Islamic interpretations of
Christianity, New York, 2001, pp. 67-69. With the exception of jurists from Andalusia
and North Africa, Ibn al-ʿArabī among them, Muslim authorities generally assume
that Christian slaughter practices conform to those of Muslim butchers. Judging
by the laws found in the Nomocanon of the Syrian Orthodox Gregory Barhebraeus
(d. 1286) (ed. P. Bedjan, Paris, 1898, pp. 458-67), this assumption appears to be
accurate.
47

